Empathy VS Raḥma: Rethinking Moral Emotion from an Islamic Perspective

Empathy is typically defined as the capacity to understand or share another person’s emotional experience-either by feeling what they feel (emotional empathy) or by understanding their perspective (cognitive empathy). In modern moral and therapeutic discourse, empathy is often portrayed as the foundation of compassion, justice, and ethical behaviour. Yet this exalted status has not gone unchallenged.

In a widely discussed essay for The New York Times, Paul Bloom (2015) argues that empathy is a poor basis for public policy or moral decision-making. We are, he suggests, simply not very good at it. Psychological studies show that people perform at or below chance in accurately discerning others’ feelings and thoughts (cf. Epley 2014; see also Chapter 31, “Empathic Accuracy”). Even with effort or training, our empathic capacities remain limited by experience: one cannot truly ‘feel from within’ what it is like to fight a war, live in poverty, undergo a religious conversion, or endure solitary confinement without having lived through these experiences oneself (Bloom, 2014).

From this, Bloom concludes that empathy, though emotionally seductive, is an unreliable moral guide. If our moral or political frameworks depend on empathy, they rest on a foundation of cognitive error and emotional partiality.

Empathy and Moral Responsibility

The implications of this critique extend beyond politics to moral philosophy itself. If moral responsibility requires empathic accuracy-if one must “feel into” others’ experiences to perceive moral reasons grounded in their interests-then most of us would be excluded from genuine moral accountability. Yet we rightly hold ordinary agents morally responsible despite their limited empathy. Thus, moral responsibility cannot depend on empathy’s successful exercise.

Bloom also distinguishes between ‘emotional’ and ‘cognitive’ empathy. His critique mainly targets the latter-the intellectual act of perspective-taking-while much of moral psychology’s defence of empathy focuses on the former. Some might argue that emotional empathy presupposes cognitive empathy: one cannot feel what another feels without understanding their context.

However, counterexamples abound. Individuals on the autism spectrum, or those with certain intellectual disabilities, may exhibit emotional empathy without robust cognitive empathy.

Bloom’s concern nevertheless remains relevant, for moral understanding does require a cognitive component. Simply ‘feeling’ another’s pain (emotional empathy) may not disclose moral reasons for action. Emotional contagion can motivate altruism (Batson et al. 1987; Batson & Shaw 1991; Batson 2014), but it is morally blind: one might feel equal pity for a limping rat, Tiny Tim Cratchit, or even a limping Hitler. Cognitive empathy, though limited, allows for discernment-but only within a fallible human frame.

Empathy as a Bad Moral Guide

This concern is echoed and extended by Jesse Prinz (2011a, 2011b; cf. Bloom 2013, 2014), who argues that empathy is not only unnecessary for morality but can actively undermine it. Prinz focuses on ‘emotional empathy’, “a kind of emotional mimicry … feeling what one takes another person to be feeling” (Prinz 2011b: 212), and examines its purported roles in moral judgment, development, and motivation.

Empathy, he argues, is not needed to judge moral wrongs. We can recognise cruelty, greed, or injustice without imagining the victim’s feelings. Many wrongs-such as necrophilia, consensual incest, or desecrating graves-are “victimless,” and empathy plays no part in our disapproval of them. Even when emotion contributes to moral judgment, the necessary emotions may be anger, guilt, or indignation rather than empathy (Prinz 2011b: 213–216).

Empathy is equally dispensable in moral development, where psychological studies reveal only correlation, not causation. Nor is empathy required for moral motivation, since emotions like guilt or shame already move us to moral action (Prinz 2011b: 218–220).

Worse still, empathy’s selectivity can corrupt moral reasoning. It is biased toward proximity and similarity-we empathise more easily with those who look like us, live near us, or share our values. It fuels in-group favouritism, can be manipulated in legal or political settings, and has been invoked to justify violence when misdirected toward a cause or group (Prinz 2011b: 225–227; see also Bloom 2013). For these reasons, Prinz concludes that empathy “is not especially motivating and it is so vulnerable to bias and selectivity that it fails to provide a broad umbrella of moral concern” (Prinz 2011b: 227).

Beyond Empathy: Raḥma as a Holistic Moral Framework

From an Islamic perspective, these critiques resonate deeply. Interestingly, there is no single Qur’anic or Prophetic term equivalent to the modern psychological notion of “empathy.” The Qur’an and Sunnah do not exhort believers to “empathise” in the Rogerian or humanistic sense; rather, they call toward ‘raḥma’-a divinely grounded mercy that encompasses compassion, justice, and moral wisdom.

Raḥma derives from the same root as ar-Raḥman and ar-Raḥim, two of the most frequently invoked Names of God. It is not a fleeting emotional response but a stable moral orientation rooted in divine attributes. While empathy invites us to ‘feel with’ another, ‘raḥma’ commands us to ‘act rightly’ (and feel) toward them, in accordance with divine guidance.

Where empathy can lead to partiality and moral blindness, raḥma anchors compassion in revelation. It balances emotion with justice (ʿadl) and wisdom (ḥikma). The Prophet ﷺ was described as “a mercy to all worlds” (raḥmatan lil-ʿalamin, 21:107), and his compassion did not depend on emotional resonance or personal affinity-it was guided by divine purpose.

Empathy, Therapy, and the Islamic Ethic of Raḥma

In modern psychotherapy, especially within the Rogerian or humanistic tradition, empathy is seen as a cornerstone of the therapeutic relationship. The therapist is trained to “enter the client’s frame of reference” and “see the world as the client sees it.”However, this framework assumes a human-centerer moral universe, unanchored by divine revelation.

From an Islamic standpoint, this creates ethical tension. If a Muslim client expresses a desire to pursue an action clearly prohibited in Islam-such as engaging in an illicit relationship-the therapist’s role is not to ‘validate’ or ‘endorse’ this desire in the name of empathy. Doing so would contradict the divine framework. The therapist may ‘understand’ (which is part of empathy) and acknowledge the client’s struggle (which is a form of empathy), but must also respond with raḥma-that is, with compassion directed by divine guidance, aiming for the client’s ultimate spiritual and moral well-being.

Empathy and validation are not identical. Validation can imply agreement; empathy, ideally, does not. Yet in practice, therapeutic empathy often slides toward moral relativism. Raḥma, by contrast, integrates understanding with moral truth. It seeks not only to comfort but to ‘guide’-to heal the heart while aligning it with what is right.

Empathy, as modern psychology conceives it, can deepen understanding and strengthen relationships, but it is a fragile and morally unreliable foundation. As Bloom and Prinz demonstrate, empathy is selective, inconsistent, and prone to distortion. The Islamic concept of raḥma offers a more holistic and stable moral alternative. It encompasses empathy’s emotional insight but situates it within a divine moral order that safeguards against partiality and injustice.

Thus, while empathy may remain a useful tool in therapeutic and interpersonal contexts, it must be tempered by the broader and more enduring vision of raḥma: mercy that is principled, just, and rooted in the awareness of God.

References and further reading

Batson, C. Daniel. 2014. The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer. New York: Psychology Press.

Batson, C. Daniel, Fultz, Jim, & Schoenrade, Patricia A. 1987. “Distress and Empathy: Two Qualitatively Distinct Vicarious Emotions with Different Motivational Consequences.” Journal of Personality 55: 19–39.

Batson, C. Daniel, & Shaw, Laura L. 1991. “Evidence for Altruism: Toward a Pluralism of Prosocial Motives.” Psychological Inquiry 2.2: 107–122.

Bloom, Paul. 2013. “The Baby in the Well: The Case Against Empathy.” The New Yorker.

Bloom, Paul. 2014. “Against Empathy.” The Boston Review.

Bloom, Paul. 2015. “Imagining the Lives of Others.” The New York Times (The Stone, June 6, 2015).

Epley, Nicholas. 2014. Mindwise: Why We Misunderstand What Others Think, Believe, Feel, and Want. New York: Vintage.

Hobson, Peter R., et al. 2006. “Foundations for Self-Awareness: An Exploration through Autism.” Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 71: 1–166.

Kennett, Jeanette. 2002. “Autism, Empathy, and Moral Agency.” Philosophical Quarterly 52: 340–357.

Paul, Laurie Ann. 2014. Transformative Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Prinz, Jesse. 2011a. “Against Empathy.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy (Spindel Supplement) 49: 214–233.

Prinz, Jesse. 2011b. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?” In

Peter Goldie & Amy Coplan (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 211–229.

Shoemaker, David. 2015. Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Angela M. 2005. “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life.” Ethics 115: 236–271.

Stueber, Karsten R. 2006. Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.